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ON TAPP (AND LEVINE) 
Michael J. Saks* 
LAw, JUSTICE, AND THE lNDMDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
AND LEGAL lssuEs. Edited by June Louin Tapp and Felice J. 
Levine. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1977. Pp. xv, 
446. $15.95. 
The American Psychological Association is composed of 
thirty-six divisions, one of which, the Society for the Psychologi-
cal Study of Social Issues (SPSS!), has existed since the 1930s as 
an organized forum through which social scientists (predomi-
nantly social psychologists) can address social problems. For 
years SPSS! has published the Journal of Social Issues as a vehi-
cle for linking social science knowledge with what are seen in any 
period as its important social problems. This occasionally can be 
a depressing archive. As a graduate student in the earliest days 
of this decade, I dusted off some JSI volumes from the '40s, cu-
rious. to know what the era's social problems were, only to dis-
cover that they were no different from those of the present. Some 
historical reflection may assure (?) us that these are the eternal 
problems, the fundamental issues of social existence: conflicts 
over goals and methods, over resources, over principles of distrib-
utive justice, over the power to decide, and between groups asso-
ciated with competing sides of these questions. The "solutions" 
lie in improving our management of these conflicts, or in making 
them productive; we cannot expect them to disappear. 
The law and its associated institutions, of course, constitute 
a major device for managing these conflicts. Recognizing this, JS[ 
in 1971 devoted an entire issue to a collection of articles on law 
and psychology. That issue was edited by June Tapp, and it 
forms the core of Law, Justice, and the Individual in Society. 
The book is the most recent in a series sponsored by SPSSI, 
more than a few of which ought to be of interest to legal scholars 
and practitioners. Among them are Children's Rights and the 
Mental Health Professions, Towards the Elimination of Racism, 
Industrial Conflict, International Behavior, and Research Meth-
ods in Social Relations. The SPSSI series is prestigious in its 
field, and its existence is a special tribute to the authors and 
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editors who have produced it, because their contributions are 
literally that: all royalties go to the Society. 
June Louin Tapp, the senior editor of the volume under re-
view and this year's president of SPSSI, would make anyone's list 
of psychologists whose subject of study is the law and justice, and 
on more than a few such lists, her name would be at the top. A 
Professor of Child Psychology and Criminal Justice Studies and 
Adjunct Professor of Law at the U:p.iversity of Minnesota and a 
former fellow of the Harvard Law School, she has long been asso-
ciated with the American Bar Foundation and has been an officer· 
of the Law and Society Association and the American 
Psychology-Law Society. It seems that whenever an editor wants 
an article or chapter about the state of law and psychology, Pro-
fessor Tapp is asked to write it, and apparently she usually does. 
Tapp and her co-editor Felice Levine, a social psychologist and 
Research Social Scientist at the American Bar Foundation, have 
put together a volume that updates and extends that 1971 issue 
of JSI and contains revised versions of the fourteen original chap-
ters plus twelve new chapters. Most of the contributions are by 
superstars at the intersection of law and social psychology or, at 
the least, superstars of one field who make forays into the other: 
Johanneas Andenaes, Harold Berman, James Davis, Paul 
Freund, Lawrence Friedman, Lon Fuller, Sanford Kadish, Harry 
Kalven, Lawrence Kohl berg, Stuart Macaulay, Paul Meehl, Soia 
Mentschikoff, Ross Parke, Milton Rokeach, David 0. Sears, 
Elaine Walster, Phillip Zimbardo, Franklin Zimring, and, of 
course, June Tapp. 
Law and psychology "interface" (as the vernacular would 
have it) in three conceptually distinct and asymmetric ways. 
First, psychology as a science or a profession must operate under 
the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is practiced. Examples of 
current interest include legal protections for human subjects in 
federally funded research programs, tort liability for harm done 
by psychologists to clinical clients or research subjects, and the 
question whether clinical psychological services will be included 
under National Health Insurance. This first category is given no 
attention in Tapp and Levine's volume. This is not a weakness; I 
offer the fact simply to suggest what the volume does address. 
Indeed, most books on law and psychology ignore this area, per-
haps because academic and scientific folks, unlike their profes-
sional cotmterparts in the ABA, AMA, or even the AP A, tend to 
be embarrassed by organized campaigns or statements in their 
own interest. 
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Second, law, the legal process, the legal system, and law-like 
structures can be placed under the behavioral scientist's micro-
scope. In this category, we find basic research, theory, and schol-
arly research and writing on psychology and law. And from this 
category come virtually all the chapters in Tapp and Levine's 
book. As the editors point out in their opening chapter, many of 
the favorite topics of research psychologists-"processes of con-
flict, persuasion, control, authority, compliance, and morality 
... socialization, decision-making, information processing, per-
ception, memory, cognition, attitudes, group dynamics, and in-
terpersonal relations ... "-are remarkably relevant to the law's 
fundamental concerns about itself and society. 
Third, psychological knowledge can serve the law. LaWYers, 
legislators, judges, and others call on (or at least receive) the 
findings of psychological research and theory to facilitate their 
own work. Research toward this purpose is the most applied and 
practical psychological research. The most familiar example is 
the forensic clinical psychologist's appearance in trial or probate 
courts to testify on questions of competency, dangerousness, san-
ity, and so_ on. This is also the most troubling example, because 
it combines the worst of both psychology and the law: the least 
sound psychological knowledge (e.g., Ziskin, Coping with Psychi-
atric and Psychological Testimony (1975)) used in what Szasz 
(e.g., Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry (1963)) and many others have 
called the worst illustrations of due process. More current exam-
ples of this category are perception and memory researchers testi-
fying in court and contributing to evidentiary policy regarding 
eyewitness accuracy; social and personality psychologists assist-
ing with jury selection; and psychologists (and other social scien-
tists) assisting attorneys in preparing cases, appellate briefs, or 
drafting legislation on any number of substantive matters. 
When the subject matter of the law involves human behavior 
(when doesn't it?), systematic, empirically based psychological 
knowledge may inform the decisions. To the degree that the law 
operates on itself-for example, to reform its own structure or 
practices or to decide constitutional questions-research of the 
second category can become instances of the third. Most of the 
contributions to the Tapp and Levine volume, however, reside 
comfortably within the second category. The contributions are by 
no means irrelevant to practical reform, nor are the contributors 
unaware of their work's possible utility. But our legal and politi-
cal systems are not now actively employing most of this knowl-
edge and appear unlikely soon to do so. The most dramatic exam-
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pie of this is Shuman's conclusion (chapter 19) that the criminal 
law should be scrapped altogether and replaced by expanded tort 
remedies. 
At first blush, Law, Justice, and the Individual in Society: 
Psychological and Legal Issues sounds like a label that could 
describe almost anything. The table of contents reveals, however, 
that the title is actually a careful description of what is between 
the covers. The book places law, justice, and the individual 
within the larger society. It is genuinely "social psychological" in 
that its interest is the effect of social structures and institutions, 
primarily the law, on individuals. The book examines all influ-
ences at the situational or structural level and measures all ef-
fects at the individual level. By so doing, it emphasizes the pro-
cesses that mediate collective goals and social institutions in their 
effect on the behavior of individuals. The volume's four major 
sections consider (1) law as a socializing agency, (2) conceptions 
of justice as a matter of cognitive social development, (3) how 
people come to be socialized to perceive and behave in terms of 
legal systems, and (4) decision-making in legal contexts. The 
volume looks not just at our society's "law," but at law-like sys-
tems and behavior related to law, comparatively between cul-
tures, and developmentally across age cohorts. 
What is there to be learned from these chapters? Let me offer 
several discrete findings. 
1. The American legal system is primarily adversary (Nimmer, 
chapter 20). 
2. Although people naturally want to avoid compensating people 
whom their negligence has harmed, the legal system encourages 
the negligent to make equitable compensation (Macaulay and 
Waister, chapter 21). 
3. If children are raised to have positive attitudes toward individ-
ual freedom, they are more likely as adults to tolerate the exercise 
of rights by fellow citizens (Zellman and Sears, chapter 11). 
4. The decisions made by fact-finders such as arbitration panels 
or juries are determined primarily by the decision-makers' per-
sonal biases (Haggard and Mentschikoff, chapter 22). 
The reader who regards these propositions as obvious and not 
requiring the resources spent on them has helped make an impor-
tant point, one that Meehl (chapter 2) propounds, about the 
value of empirical social research to the law. Although the above 
propositions probably square with common sense, they are ac-
tually the opposite of what researchers found: 
1. The legal process in the United States is characterized by co-
operative relations, settlements, and the exchange of vital infor-
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mation by opposing counsel; only a very few disputes result in trial 
and its attendant adversary procedures. 
2. Except under specifiable conditions, people's sense of equity 
presses them to compensate those they accidentally harm; the 
processes by which lawyers, courts, and insurance companies re-
solve claims actually reduce the negligent's tendency to compen-
sate. 
3. Children, like adults, endorse freedom as an abstract principle 
but do not carry that endorsement through to concrete situations. 
4. Although biases of fact-finders have clear effects, the issues 
identified as central to the dispute itself are more powerful deter-
minants of decisions. 
Presumably, had I given the actual findings first, those, too, 
would have been regarded as obvious facts not calling for re-
search. This exercise illustrates a lesson about the study of law 
and justice-or, indeed, most other things-by social scientists: 
there are no "obvious" findings. Most outcomes are plausible. 
Ergo, once the findings are in, many commentators find them 
"obvious" whichever way they go. (Senator Proxmire take note.) 
The important contribution of an empirical study of the law and 
society is that it places some limits on theory, commentary, and 
speculation about the nature of law-related behavior and the so-
lutions to our legal and quasi-legal problems. By using empirical 
knowledge to pin down borders, such a study confines conceptual-
izing within them. A theory derived within those borders limits 
speculation and expands possible solutions to problems. 
Quite a few of the chapters of the book are noteworthy, if not 
outstanding. Some are excellently crafted, thoughtful essays 
(e.g., Kadish and Kadish, chapter 24). Others skillfully weave 
data with theory and social philosophy (e.g., Zellman and Sears, 
chapter 11). The volume includes important studies and theories 
by people centrally identified with the work reported (e.g., Ma-
caulay and W alster on "Legal Structures and Restoring Equity," 
chapter 21; Haney and Zimbardo on "The Socialization into 
Criminality: On Becoming' a Prisoner and a Guard," chapter 17). 
One contribution is nothing less than a classic and became so the 
moment it first reached print; no one interested in law and psy-
chology should fail to read Meehl's "Law and the Fireside Induc-
tions" (chapter 2). Some chapters are disappointing. Harry Kal-
ven has elsewhere brilliantly and literately woven data and ideas 
(one of my favorites is The Dignity of the Civil Jury1). But his 
contribution to this volume is not such a tapestry. By and large, 
1. 50 VA. L. R.Ev. 1055-75 (1964). 
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however, it is not difficult to find something worthwhile in almost 
all the chapters. 
Stylistically, the contributions leave more room for debate. 
The chapters are uneven. One contains a lengthy, careful, and 
painstaking review of empirical research. Another is composed of 
conclusions loosely drawn from some soft evidence. Another ana-
lyzes legal practice in terms of a particular social psychological 
theory. Yet another is very brief and speculative. Others are origi-
nal reports or re-reports of empirical research. I am not inclined 
to call this unevenness a weakness, however, particularly to those 
using the book as a teaching tool or as an introduction to law and 
psychology. The book's mix of original reports~ reviews of litera-
ture, theoretical pieces, speculation, and theoretical analyses of 
the legal system offers students a sampler of the ways in which 
research and thinking go on in law -and psychology. 
There is much, then; to praise about Law, Justice, and· the 
Individual in Society-its contributors; the broad, basic ques-
tions it addresses; and the personal moral wrestling several con-
tributors, especially the editors, frankly do in identifying their 
own role in studying law, justice, and society. Shall we make the 
law more "effective," thereby taking a measure of autonomy from 
individual people; or shall we increase· their capacity to scruti~ 
nize, decide, and, if they see fit, to disobey particular laws? Shall 
the law be a device for social control or a facilitator of greater 
independence? The editors opt for "critical compliance" and 
whatever that implies. · 
If I did not find something to complain about, in this or any 
book, I would be either remiss or disingenuous. We are now wit-
nessing the greatest of the periodic explosions of interest by law-
yers and social scientists in each other ever to occur. This decade 
has seen more J.D.-Ph.D.s, new journals, new organizations, new 
programs, new funding sources, new outlets, and new· employ-
ment options than ever before. Containing as it does so many of 
the established stars of the law-psychology intersection, this 
volume represents largely a summing up of much of the scholar-
ship of the 1950s and 1960s, pre-explosion, as it were. (It is im-
pressive to see how much went on prior to the current explosion.) 
At least two of the contributors have already died, and most 
others are professors emeriti, deans, or at least full professors. 
Certainly I do not include every author in this broad sweep. Nor 
do I mean any derogation of those I do include, for their scholarly 
contributions are enormously valuable and have long been re-
spected by the rest of the field, including me. Nor do I wish to 
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create a generation gap, when one of the most rewarding aspects 
of scholarly work is that one's vigor can increase with age. But 
while this is an est~emed assembly, it represents largely the 
accomplishments that have been, and less those that are. 
A field of research is only as good as its next finding. The 
future of this field, if recent work by its rising stars-largely unre-
presented in this volume-is any example, is bright indeed. Their 
work will be at once more rigorous and more relevant. They are 
altogether more comfortable with theory and with application. 
More of their work will occur in all three of the categories. It will 
be, and perhaps already is, what is represented by this volume, 
and then some. Both social science and society will be the benefi-
ciaries. 
